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Cause Before Symptom — November 21, 2026
Opening — The Emergency Before the Deadline
Something unusual happened across America in November. Within a short period, several important computer systems experienced serious disruptions. Microsoft services failed. Banking customers encountered problems. United Airlines experienced difficulties. The Federal Aviation Administration ordered a nationwide ground stop. Even the National Security Agency experienced problems with an internal communications network. When Americans saw these incidents occurring so close together, many wondered whether the country was experiencing a coordinated cyberattack. Others suspected foreign governments, organized criminals, or an attack on the infrastructure that supports everyday American life.
The federal government offered a different explanation. On November 18, senior national-security officials appeared before the House Homeland Security Committee and told lawmakers that they had found no evidence connecting the major outages to a coordinated malicious attack. They described separate problems involving maintenance, software changes, and aging infrastructure. That explanation may be correct, but it does not eliminate every question. It raises another one. How can so many important systems experience technical difficulties during such a short period, and what does that reveal about the infrastructure Americans depend upon?
Now consider what else is happening. Congress faces a December 11 funding deadline. The November elections have changed the political landscape, and Democrats are preparing to assume control of both chambers in January. The outgoing Congress still has authority to make decisions before that transition. Government agencies have modernization needs, contractors have proposals, and lawmakers are debating substantial expenditures. A technological emergency occurring during this period could increase pressure to approve programs that might otherwise receive more extensive scrutiny.
That does not mean somebody deliberately created the emergency. We have no evidence establishing that. But consider how business works. A company does not need to cause a problem to benefit financially from the response. A manufacturer can profit from rebuilding after a storm without causing the storm. A cybersecurity company can benefit from increased demand after an outage without causing the outage. The important question is whether the proposed solution is necessary, whether the price is justified, and whether the public receives what it pays for.
There is another development taking place far beyond Washington. The Bank for International Settlements and major financial institutions have spent years developing new ways to transfer money electronically. Their projects involve tokenized bank deposits, shared settlement systems, programmable transaction instructions, and new methods of verifying financial activity. Some experiments have already transferred real monetary value. These developments could make international payments faster and more efficient. They could also increase dependence on institutions controlling the underlying technology.
Tonight, we will examine whether these two developments could become connected. Could repeated technology disruptions create demand for expensive cybersecurity programs? Could security concerns also encourage governments and banks to adopt increasingly integrated financial systems? And if those systems become essential, who will protect ordinary people when a transaction is rejected, a computer fails, or an institution makes a mistake?
We are not here to frighten anyone. We are here to examine what the evidence establishes and what remains uncertain. Proverbs 18:13 warns against answering a matter before hearing it. That applies to those who immediately declare a conspiracy, and it applies to those who dismiss legitimate questions without examining the facts.
Our investigation begins with the calendar, follows the money through government contractors, and then examines the financial infrastructure being developed internationally. We will consider possible motives without confusing them with proof. We will also ask what Americans can do to demand accountability without surrendering their judgment to fear.
Because the most important question is not whether Washington can spend billions of dollars in the name of security. It is whether those billions will make Americans safer, preserve their independence, and produce results that justify the cost.
Investigation One — December 11 and the Power of a Deadline
Most Americans know that Congress spends enormous amounts of money, but relatively few understand how those spending decisions are made. Federal agencies prepare budgets, lawmakers negotiate appropriations, and the president signs or vetoes legislation. Sometimes Congress cannot agree on full-year funding and instead passes a continuing resolution, which temporarily maintains government operations. These arrangements can keep essential services functioning, but they also create deadlines that place pressure on lawmakers to reach agreements.
The current continuing resolution expires on December 11. Unless Congress approves additional funding, agencies could face a funding lapse beginning December 12. This deadline is especially important because the country is approaching a change in congressional control. Democrats are preparing to assume the majority in both chambers when the new Congress convenes in January. Until then, the outgoing Congress retains legislative authority. Decisions made during these final weeks can affect spending long after the political transition.
Imagine an agency that has requested money to replace aging computers for several years. The request may be legitimate, but Congress has postponed it because lawmakers disagree about costs or priorities. Then a series of major technology outages occurs. Suddenly, the agency can point to those failures as evidence that waiting may expose essential services to unacceptable risks. A proposal that previously appeared expensive may now appear urgent. The problem has not necessarily changed, but the political environment surrounding the request has.
That is one way an emergency can influence government spending without anybody manufacturing the emergency. But we must understand the difference between requesting money and receiving it. An agency may request ten billion dollars. Congress may authorize a program. Lawmakers may appropriate funds. The agency may then obligate money through contracts and eventually make payments. These are separate stages. A proposed expenditure is not the same as money already transferred to a company.
Consider the defense reconciliation proposal discussed in November. President Trump renewed his call for a package of approximately $350 billion on November 12. That was before the cluster of outages became the subject of widespread congressional attention. By November 19, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers was indicating that the original amount was not likely to advance, while discussing the possibility of a smaller package around $100 billion. The proposal involved broad defense priorities, including military capabilities, rather than a verified $350 billion cybersecurity contract.
This distinction matters enormously. We cannot claim that November's technology failures produced a $350 billion spending request when the proposal was already being discussed. Nor can we claim that a smaller defense package represents money awarded to artificial intelligence companies. Those statements would mislead the public. The relevant question is whether specific cybersecurity provisions were added, expanded, or accelerated after the disruptions, and whether the supporting evidence justified those changes.
The deadline also does not mean that only Republicans favor cybersecurity spending. Both parties have supported modernization and security initiatives, although they may disagree over funding levels, oversight, and priorities. Political incentives exist on both sides. The outgoing Congress may wish to complete certain programs, while incoming lawmakers may prefer to review them. Neither preference establishes whether a particular expenditure is wise.
The evidence we need is specific. We need bill numbers, agency requests, committee amendments, funding amounts, and contract records. We need to compare what was proposed before the outages with what was proposed afterward. If an official cites a particular disruption as the reason for an additional expenditure, that statement should be examined alongside the technical findings.
The Bible teaches in Proverbs 21:5 that diligent planning leads toward abundance, while haste leads toward want. That principle applies to public finance. A genuine emergency may require prompt action, but haste does not eliminate the responsibility to spend wisely. The December deadline creates pressure. Our responsibility is to determine whether that pressure produces necessary repairs or unnecessary obligations.
Investigation Two — What Really Happened to America's Computers?
When a computer system stops working, the people affected usually see only the consequences. An airline passenger cannot board a flight. A banking customer cannot complete a transaction. An employee cannot access an important network. The public may hear that the system is experiencing technical difficulties, but that explanation often provides little comfort. People want to know what happened, whether their information is safe, and whether the failure will happen again.
During November, several major disruptions attracted national attention. Microsoft services experienced problems. Reports involved JPMorgan Chase, United Airlines, Apple services, and the National Security Agency's internal network. The FAA ordered a nationwide ground stop after a serious communications problem. The concentration of incidents naturally raised suspicions that they might be connected. But a series of outages is not automatically a series of cyberattacks.
On November 18, Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin, Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton, and FBI Deputy Director Christopher Raia testified before the House Homeland Security Committee. They told lawmakers that investigators had not found evidence of a coordinated malicious cyberattack linking the incidents. Clayton described separate service outages associated with maintenance and technical changes. Mullin expressed approximately 98 percent confidence that foreign adversaries were not responsible for the disruptions under review.
The FAA incident provides a particularly useful example. Officials described maintenance work performed by telecommunications contractor L3Harris Technologies at a remote facility. Aging copper communications lines were being replaced with fiber-optic connections. During the changeover, a router reportedly began overwhelming other routers with traffic, disrupting the network. That is a specific technical explanation involving equipment and maintenance, not evidence that an enemy government attacked American aviation.
But this explanation raises its own questions. Why could one malfunctioning component cause such extensive disruption? What safeguards existed to prevent the failure from spreading? Was the maintenance properly tested? Did the contractor and the FAA have adequate recovery procedures? Those questions matter because a system can be vulnerable to serious failure without being attacked by anybody.
The NSA disruption deserves similar scrutiny. Officials described maintenance and software changes, while some lawmakers pressed for more precise explanations. Representative Dan Goldman challenged Clayton's responses concerning the internal network problem. Such questioning is appropriate. A public assurance that investigators found no external interference is important, but the public also benefits from understanding how essential systems are maintained and what protections exist when technical changes go wrong.
There is another distinction involving artificial intelligence. Federal officials discussed software patching and upgrades as explanations for several failures. Lawmakers and outside cybersecurity specialists raised the more specific possibility that AI-assisted discovery of vulnerabilities was creating pressure to install repairs rapidly. That possibility is plausible, but it was not established as the cause of every outage. We must not present an emerging theory as a completed forensic investigation.
Consider an older banking system connected to modern software. Engineers discover a security weakness and install an update. The update solves one problem but unexpectedly interferes with another program. Customers lose access even though no criminal entered the network. Multiply that possibility across organizations using similar software suppliers, and several failures may appear connected even when their immediate causes differ.
There is still room for skepticism. Officials can be mistaken, and investigations can uncover additional information. But skepticism should lead to requests for records, not automatic accusations. We should examine incident reports, maintenance schedules, contractor responsibilities, recovery times, and independent technical findings.
Ecclesiastes 7:25 describes the pursuit of wisdom through searching and investigation. That is the appropriate response here. We should neither invent an attacker nor excuse preventable failures. If maintenance caused the disruptions, Americans deserve to know why essential systems were so vulnerable and whether the responsible organizations have corrected the underlying weaknesses.
Investigation Three — Artificial Intelligence and the Business of Cybersecurity
Artificial intelligence is changing cybersecurity in ways that are both promising and troubling. For decades, computer specialists have searched for vulnerabilities in software before criminals could exploit them. Some weaknesses are obvious mistakes, while others are hidden inside complicated programs. Finding them can require extensive testing and specialized knowledge. AI tools can assist researchers by examining code, identifying patterns, and helping investigate potential defects more quickly than traditional methods alone.
That is an advantage for defenders, but criminals can use related capabilities. AI can help generate convincing fraudulent messages, analyze publicly available information, and automate portions of malicious activity. It can reduce the time needed to perform certain tasks that previously required greater expertise. This does not mean AI makes every attack successful. It means organizations must adapt to a changing environment in which both defenders and attackers have increasingly powerful tools.
There is a less obvious problem. Discovering vulnerabilities faster does not necessarily mean repairing them safely. Imagine a bank operating thousands of interconnected programs. An AI-assisted review identifies a serious weakness in software that has been running for twenty years. Engineers must decide whether to install a repair immediately or conduct additional testing. Delaying could expose the system to exploitation, but rushing could interrupt essential operations.
This is why the November outages attracted attention from cybersecurity specialists. Some experts suggested that organizations might be experiencing more disruption because AI-assisted vulnerability discovery is accelerating the pace of software changes. Federal officials described maintenance and patching problems, while lawmakers explored whether faster vulnerability discovery was contributing to operational instability. Those are related observations, but they are not identical findings.
Now consider the business opportunity. A company can sell AI-assisted vulnerability detection, automated code analysis, network monitoring, identity verification, and incident response. Another company can provide the cloud infrastructure needed to operate those tools. Consulting firms can help agencies migrate older software to modern systems. Contractors can sell continuing support, maintenance, and upgrades. Each service may address a genuine need, but the combined market creates substantial incentives to encourage adoption.
Suppose a federal agency announces that its systems are vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated attacks. A contractor proposes an expensive platform that promises continuous monitoring and automated protection. The product may be excellent. But Congress should still ask whether it addresses the agency's actual weaknesses, whether independent testing supports the claims, and whether less expensive alternatives exist.
The public should also understand the difference between preventing an attack and recovering from an outage. An organization may spend heavily on software designed to detect intrusions while neglecting backup systems, equipment redundancy, and recovery procedures. If its problem is a faulty router or unsuccessful software update, the latest AI detection platform may not prevent another failure. Security requires more than purchasing impressive technology.
There is another risk when vendors evaluate their own products. A company may identify vulnerabilities and then offer the solution. That arrangement is not automatically improper, but independent assessment becomes essential. Customers should know whether the proposed remedy works and whether the vendor has financial incentives to exaggerate the problem.
This creates a cycle worth watching. New technology identifies weaknesses. Organizations rush to repair them. Some repairs produce disruptions. Those disruptions increase demand for additional technology. The cycle can become expensive without anybody deliberately causing harm. Poor management, inadequate testing, and commercial incentives may be sufficient to produce costly results.
Proverbs 27:12 teaches that a prudent person foresees danger and takes precautions. But prudence requires understanding the danger accurately. A government that responds to every computer problem by purchasing more complicated systems may increase costs without improving resilience. The goal should be measurable protection, not the appearance of action.
Investigation Four — Could Washington Be Rushing to Spend Billions?
Let us consider the central financial question of tonight's investigation. Could the November disruptions increase pressure for federal spending before the congressional transition? The answer is that such a mechanism is possible. But establishing that it happened requires more than observing that outages and budget negotiations occurred during the same month. We need to examine the actual decisions, the amounts involved, and the reasons officials provided.
Imagine a contractor that has spent years developing a cybersecurity platform for federal agencies. The company believes its technology could improve network monitoring and reduce the risk of unauthorized access. It has submitted proposals, met with agency officials, and advocated for modernization funding. Then several major computer systems experience failures, and lawmakers begin discussing the dangers of aging infrastructure. The contractor's existing proposal may suddenly attract greater attention.
The company does not need to cause the outages to benefit from them. Its sales representatives can point to the incidents as evidence that government systems require investment. Officials may feel greater pressure to act quickly, especially with a funding deadline approaching. That is a recognizable commercial incentive. But an incentive is not proof of manipulation, and increased attention is not the same as a contract award.
The distinction matters because a legitimate modernization project might become more urgent after a real failure. Suppose an agency discovers that essential communications equipment is obsolete and no longer supported by its manufacturer. Replacing it promptly could protect public safety. But suppose the agency responds by purchasing an expensive AI platform unrelated to the equipment that failed. That would raise questions about whether the proposed solution addresses the actual problem.
The $350 billion defense reconciliation proposal illustrates the danger of confusing timing with causation. President Trump was advocating for that spending before the November outages became a national controversy. The proposal involved broad military priorities, including missile defense and munitions. By November 19, lawmakers were discussing a smaller alternative. Those negotiations are important, but they do not demonstrate that the outages generated hundreds of billions in new cybersecurity spending.
We also need to distinguish proposed appropriations from actual contracts. A lawmaker may announce support for a program, but no money reaches a contractor until the appropriate funding and procurement steps occur. Agencies may obligate money over several years, and actual payments may follow the completion of specific work. Without those records, an investigator cannot accurately calculate who benefited.
The most useful evidence would include the original budget request, later amendments, committee reports, agency justifications, and procurement documents. We would look for statements connecting a particular outage to a particular expenditure. We would also examine whether the agency obtained independent technical assessments and considered alternative solutions.
Lobbying records could provide additional context. If a contractor advocated for a program before the outages and later received an award, that relationship deserves examination. But it would not automatically establish wrongdoing. Stronger evidence would involve misleading technical claims, undisclosed conflicts, improper contracting procedures, or a decision that disregarded better and less expensive alternatives.
There is also a political reality. Both parties support various forms of cybersecurity spending. The outgoing Congress may want to complete certain priorities before January, while incoming lawmakers may prefer additional oversight. The relevant question is not which party benefits from a frightening headline. It is whether public money is being spent for documented public purposes.
Luke 14:28 describes the wisdom of calculating the cost before beginning construction. Government should follow the same principle. If Washington claims that billions are necessary to protect Americans, lawmakers should explain the problem, identify the solution, disclose the cost, and establish how success will be measured. A deadline may justify urgency, but it does not justify abandoning arithmetic.
Investigation Five — Palantir, CISA, and the People Behind the Contracts
When Americans hear that the government is spending money on technology, they may imagine a federal agency purchasing computers or software directly from a manufacturer. In reality, large technology programs often involve complicated networks of contractors. One company may provide the main platform, while others supply cloud computing, security monitoring, hardware, identity verification, and technical support. A project can create financial relationships that continue for many years after the original contract is signed.
These arrangements can be necessary, but they also create dependence. A government agency may build its operations around proprietary software that is difficult to replace. Employees become trained on the platform, information is stored in specialized formats, and other systems are designed to connect with it. If the supplier raises prices or experiences problems, switching to another company may be costly. This is commonly called vendor lock-in.
That concern becomes more serious when the technology supports essential government services. A contractor operating an important identity system, payment platform, or security network may have influence beyond the value of its contract. If the government cannot easily transfer the work elsewhere, the supplier gains commercial leverage. That is why procurement oversight must examine long-term obligations, not merely the initial purchase price.
A recent development involving Palantir gives us a concrete example of the relationship between government contractors and federal cybersecurity leadership. On November 9, President Trump nominated Michael LoSapio, Palantir's chief information security officer, to lead the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, known as CISA. Palantir provides data and software services to government customers. CISA helps protect federal civilian networks and works with organizations responsible for critical infrastructure.
The nomination preceded the recent cluster of outages. We cannot describe it as a response to those incidents. Nevertheless, it raises legitimate questions about how government manages potential conflicts of interest when executives from major contractors enter public office. Such appointments are not inherently improper. Private-sector experience can provide valuable expertise. But the public needs confidence that government decisions will not improperly favor a former employer.
The nomination also encountered Senate scrutiny. During the November 19 confirmation process, Senators Ron Wyden and Thom Tillis expressed objections involving LoSapio's responses to questions about January 6 and the 2020 election. On November 20, Wyden recorded an intention to object to unanimous-consent consideration of the nomination. Those objections concern the confirmation process and should not be presented as findings of financial misconduct.
The financial questions are separate. What ethics agreements would apply if LoSapio were confirmed? Would he be required to recuse himself from certain matters involving Palantir? What authority would he possess over contracts, policy, or information affecting companies in the same market? How would independent officials review potential conflicts? These are appropriate questions for any nominee moving from a major contractor into a senior government position.
We should also examine the actual financial trail. Federal procurement records can identify prime contractors, award amounts, modifications, and some subcontracting relationships. Lobbying disclosures may show which policies companies advocated. Inspector-general reports and Government Accountability Office reviews can reveal whether agencies followed required procedures and achieved promised results.
But we must avoid another accounting mistake. A billion-dollar contract does not necessarily produce a billion dollars in profit. Contractors incur expenses, and some awards represent maximum potential values rather than money already paid. Similarly, the existence of a government relationship does not establish corruption.
The biblical standard is straightforward. Proverbs 11:1 condemns dishonest balances and values honest weights. Applied to public spending, that means using accurate figures, fair competition, and transparent measures of performance. The Palantir–CISA nomination is a documented relationship deserving oversight, not proof of a secret spending arrangement. Our investigation becomes stronger when we preserve that distinction.
Investigation Six — The Bank for International Settlements and the Future of Money
The Bank for International Settlements occupies an important position in international finance. It provides banking services to central banks, supports cooperation among monetary authorities, and hosts committees involved in financial standards. It is sometimes called the bank for central banks. That description helps explain its role, but it does not mean the BIS possesses unlimited legal authority over every national government or financial institution.
For years, the BIS has published research about digital money and payment modernization. A September 2017 Quarterly Review examined central bank cryptocurrencies and the different characteristics of digital monetary instruments. Its March 2020 publications explored changes in payments and tokenization, including securities settlement. In December 2021, BIS researchers examined decentralized finance and warned that systems described as decentralized can still develop concentrated centers of governance.
That last point is important. A computer system may distribute records across many machines while still depending on a small group of organizations to establish its rules. Someone determines who may participate, what constitutes a valid transaction, and how disagreements are resolved. Technology can change the method of recording money without eliminating the question of authority.
Now consider Project Agorá. The BIS and the Institute of International Finance have worked with central banks and major private financial institutions to examine a shared platform for wholesale cross-border payments. The project combines tokenized commercial-bank deposits with tokenized central-bank reserves. Its stated purpose is to reduce delays, costs, and complexity in international banking transactions.
In July 2026, the project conducted real-value testing involving 28 participating financial institutions and central banks across Asia, Europe, and North America. The experiments covered six currencies: the Swiss franc, euro, British pound, Japanese yen, South Korean won, and United States dollar. Participants completed 30 transactions across 17 scenarios, with a total value of approximately 800,000 Swiss francs. The BIS reported an average settlement time of approximately 80 seconds.
Those figures demonstrate technical progress, but they also establish the limits of the experiment. This was controlled wholesale testing, not the conversion of the world's money into a compulsory digital currency. The participating institutions were examining whether a prototype could perform specific functions under realistic conditions.
The project also identifies companies and institutions involved in the technical work. SIX served as the operational facilitator for real-value testing, while Kaleido provided technology support. Major participating financial institutions included JPMorgan Chase, Citi, Deutsche Bank, UBS, BNY, and others. These names are useful because they identify organizations participating in an actual project. Their involvement does not establish that they received improper government payments or secretly controlled the experiment.
One important capability is conditional settlement. Two banks exchanging currencies may want both sides of a transaction to complete together. If one side cannot settle, the system can prevent the other from being left exposed. That is a practical financial protection. But the broader technology also allows payment workflows and compliance requirements to be incorporated into software.
That raises questions about governance. Who establishes the conditions? Who approves participating institutions? What happens when a payment is rejected incorrectly? Can a customer or financial institution challenge the decision? What protections exist if the platform fails?
We must distinguish wholesale settlement from retail central bank digital currencies. Project Agorá does not establish that ordinary Americans will be required to use central bank wallets or that cash will disappear. But wholesale infrastructure can influence how banks operate and which technologies become important to financial services.
The Bible warns in Ecclesiastes 5:8 about layers of officials overseeing one another while injustice may still occur. The lesson is not that every institution is corrupt. It is that complex authority requires scrutiny. As money becomes increasingly dependent on shared technology, accountability must be built into the system rather than promised after problems arise.
Investigation Seven — Could Cybersecurity Become Financial Control?
Imagine that Americans experience repeated problems accessing their money. Banking websites fail, payment applications stop working, and businesses cannot complete transactions. Officials explain that financial institutions rely on outdated technology and that criminals are becoming more sophisticated. The public begins demanding a safer system, and government agencies propose stronger identity verification, shared payment infrastructure, automated compliance, and continuous monitoring.
Many of those proposals could provide genuine benefits. Banks should protect customers from fraud. Payment networks should identify unauthorized activity. International transactions should not require unnecessary delays or expenses. The question is not whether financial technology should improve. The question is what happens when security requirements become conditions for participating in everyday economic life.
Consider digital identity verification. A bank may require customers to prove their identity before opening accounts or transferring money. That can reduce fraud and help satisfy legal obligations. But what happens if the verification system makes a mistake? A legitimate customer may be denied access because of incorrect information, a software defect, or an administrative error.
Now imagine that hundreds of financial institutions rely on the same identity provider. A single technical failure could affect customers across many banks. The system may be efficient under normal conditions while creating a shared point of vulnerability. That is one reason centralization can increase certain risks even when it reduces others.
Automated transaction monitoring creates similar questions. Software may identify suspicious activity and delay payments that resemble fraud. That can protect customers. But automated systems can also produce false positives. A business owner may be unable to pay employees because a legitimate transfer has been flagged incorrectly. The customer needs a clear explanation and a practical way to resolve the problem.
These concerns do not require a retail central bank digital currency. Much of the financial system already operates electronically through commercial-bank deposits, payment applications, identity services, and private networks. Additional tokenization could make these arrangements more efficient, but it could also increase dependence on organizations that control essential infrastructure.
The BIS's Project Agorá illustrates how conditional transactions can work in wholesale banking. Its prototype supports programmed payment workflows and compliance requirements. That is not evidence that governments have decided to restrict ordinary citizens' purchases. But it demonstrates why the rules governing financial software deserve public attention.
There is also a social question. When people become frightened by repeated technology failures, they may become more willing to accept systems promising greater security. A government does not need to manufacture an emergency for public attitudes to change. Real disruptions can create demand for solutions that carry consequences beyond their original purpose.
The important distinction is between protection and unchecked authority. A well-designed payment system can improve fraud prevention while preserving privacy, competition, and legal remedies. A poorly designed system can make customers dependent on decisions they cannot understand or challenge. The technology itself does not determine which outcome will occur. Laws, governance, and institutional behavior matter.
Physical cash also deserves consideration. Cash cannot replace every modern financial service, but it can provide a useful alternative when digital systems fail. Preserving practical alternatives can strengthen resilience. So can competition among payment providers, independent security audits, transparent rules, and clear procedures for correcting mistakes.
James 2:6 warns against dishonoring the poor while giving excessive deference to the wealthy. That principle is relevant when designing systems that determine access to financial services. A person with limited resources may suffer far more from an incorrectly blocked payment than a wealthy institution does. Security policies should protect vulnerable customers rather than leave them without remedies.
The question for Americans is therefore practical. If a financial platform becomes essential, who controls access, who can correct errors, and what alternatives remain available? A system that prevents fraud but leaves honest people powerless has not solved every problem. It has created another responsibility that must be addressed.
Investigation Eight — Catherine Austin Fitts and the Economics of Dependence
Catherine Austin Fitts offers a perspective worth examining because she worked in both major financial markets and the federal government. She served as a managing director at Dillon, Read & Co. and later became Assistant Secretary of Housing and Federal Housing Commissioner under President George H. W. Bush. Her professional experience involved investment banking, housing finance, government programs, and the relationship between public policy and private capital.
In her work Dillon Read & Co. Inc. & The Aristocracy of Stock Profits, Fitts examines relationships between government decisions and financial interests. Her broader argument is that institutions can accumulate influence through control of investment flows, public contracts, and information. These interpretations deserve examination, but her professional background does not automatically prove every allegation or prediction she has made.
One useful lesson from her approach is to examine where money goes rather than stopping at what a program promises. A government may announce that it is improving cybersecurity. That may be a legitimate objective. But investigators should still ask who receives the contracts, who owns the companies, who controls the resulting systems, and whether the public receives measurable benefits.
Consider a federal agency purchasing a new digital platform. The initial agreement may cover software development and installation. But the agency may also require continuing cloud services, technical support, security monitoring, and upgrades. Over time, the total cost can exceed the original purchase price. If the system is difficult to replace, the supplier may gain significant commercial leverage.
This does not establish corruption. Maintaining complicated technology costs money. But it creates an incentive for suppliers to encourage long-term dependence. The government should understand that incentive before committing public funds.
Now consider financial infrastructure. A company that controls an essential payment service may exercise influence without owning the money moving through the system. An identity provider may determine whether a customer satisfies verification requirements. A payment network may decide how transactions are processed. A bank may restrict access under applicable laws and account agreements. These are different forms of authority, but each can affect economic participation.
Fitts has warned that increasingly integrated digital finance could enable extensive monitoring and restrictions on transactions. Those concerns should be tested against actual technical designs and legal requirements. We should not assume that every financial innovation is intended to produce the outcomes she fears. Nor should we dismiss the possibility that poorly governed systems could concentrate authority in harmful ways.
The same approach applies to the current cybersecurity debate. Suppose Congress approves an expensive modernization program after a series of outages. The public should ask whether the project addresses the actual technical failures, whether the contract was competitively awarded, and whether independent auditors can evaluate the results. If the government becomes dependent on one supplier, it should explain how that dependence will be managed.
There is also an important distinction between commercial revenue and personal enrichment. A company receiving a large contract must pay employees, suppliers, and operating expenses. Contract value is not the same as profit. A government announcement is not the same as an actual payment. Accurate accounting is essential if we want to understand who benefits.
The Bible offers a warning in Jeremiah 22:13 against building prosperity through injustice and withholding what is owed to workers. That principle directs our attention toward fair dealing rather than merely toward the size of an institution. Wealth itself does not establish wrongdoing. The question is whether the wealth was obtained through honest exchange and whether those affected were treated justly.
The value of examining Fitts's framework is that it encourages us to look beneath public promises and investigate financial relationships. But the evidence must determine the conclusion. We should neither adopt every warning as fact nor reject uncomfortable questions because they challenge powerful institutions.
Investigation Nine — China, Russia, Europe, and Competing Financial Networks
The future of money cannot be understood by examining American institutions alone. Governments around the world are developing new payment technologies, digital currency experiments, and alternative financial arrangements. Their motivations differ. Some emphasize efficiency and lower transaction costs. Others seek greater monetary sovereignty, resilience against disruptions, or reduced dependence on foreign financial infrastructure.
China has pursued digital currency development through the People's Bank of China and associated institutions. Russia has developed a digital ruble initiative while also exploring payment arrangements that reduce reliance on systems affected by international sanctions. European authorities have examined the digital euro and other methods of modernizing financial services. These programs operate under different laws and political systems, and they should not be treated as identical.
Project mBridge provides an important example of international experimentation. The initiative began through cooperation involving the BIS Innovation Hub, the monetary authorities of China, Hong Kong, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. It explored cross-border settlement using central bank digital currencies on shared technical infrastructure. A pilot involving real-value transactions took place in 2022, and the project reached a minimum viable product stage in 2024.
Saudi Arabia joined the project in 2024, but its participation later ended. The Saudi Central Bank reported that it completed its planned experimentation in 2025. Reports in September 2026 described Saudi Arabia's withdrawal. That is an important correction because participation in a financial experiment does not necessarily represent a permanent commitment. Countries can join projects, evaluate the results, and decide not to continue.
The BIS announced in October 2024 that it was handing mBridge over to its participating institutions. Its own project page now describes the BIS project as concluded. That does not mean every participating institution abandoned the technology. It means the BIS's role changed, and subsequent developments must be examined through the organizations continuing the work.
This history reveals something important about international finance. Countries may cooperate on technical standards while disagreeing strongly about politics, trade, and monetary policy. A shared payment experiment does not establish that every participating government accepts the same political objectives. Cooperation can be limited to solving a practical problem.
Consider a business in one country purchasing equipment from a supplier in another. Traditional international payments may require several banks, currency conversions, compliance checks, and settlement procedures. A new platform might reduce costs and delays. That could benefit businesses and consumers. But alternative settlement networks could also affect the influence of existing banking relationships and sanctions arrangements.
These possibilities help explain why governments with different interests are examining new technology. China may emphasize payment efficiency and financial sovereignty. Russia may place greater emphasis on alternatives to systems affected by sanctions. European authorities may focus on domestic legal protections, competition, and the role of public money. We should examine each country's official rules rather than assuming that similar technology proves identical intentions.
There is also a question about competition. Multiple payment networks might provide alternatives when one system becomes unreliable or expensive. But if governments require institutions to use only approved platforms, the number of practical choices could shrink. The result depends on law, governance, and interoperability.
The Bible's account in Genesis 11 describes people attempting to establish unity through a great collective undertaking. We should not turn that passage into proof about modern banking technology. But it invites reflection on the relationship between cooperation, ambition, and human authority. Working together can accomplish useful things, yet shared power still requires wisdom and restraint.
The international evidence establishes that financial modernization is occurring through several networks. It does not establish that one institution has already imposed a compulsory worldwide digital currency. The more useful investigation asks who controls each network, which laws apply, and what alternatives remain available to the people and institutions using it.
Investigation Ten — What Evidence Would Actually Prove a Spending Scheme?
We have examined the technology failures, the congressional deadline, the financial incentives, and the development of international payment infrastructure. Now we must ask what evidence would establish a direct connection between these developments. This is where an investigation becomes more demanding. A plausible explanation may identify a possible motive, but a documented finding requires records showing what happened.
The first step is to establish the cause of each major outage. Investigators should examine the affected system, the date of failure, maintenance records, technical logs, contractor responsibilities, and independent findings. If an outage resulted from a faulty router, that should be reported. If it resulted from a software update, the relevant change should be identified. If investigators discovered malicious activity, the evidence should be examined. We cannot assume that one explanation applies to every incident.
The second step is to identify the financial response. Did an agency request additional funding after the disruption? Was the request already pending? Did the amount change? What specific technology or service was proposed? If the agency requested money to replace the equipment that failed, the connection may be straightforward. If it requested an unrelated AI platform, lawmakers should explain why that purchase addresses the problem.
The third step involves Congress. We need bill text, committee reports, amendments, appropriations, and public statements. Did lawmakers cite the November outages when supporting additional spending? Did a committee increase a program's funding? Did legislation alter procurement requirements? Did officials argue that ordinary oversight should be shortened because of an emergency? These records could establish whether the incidents influenced particular decisions.
The fourth step concerns contractors. Which companies received awards? Did they hold previous contracts with the affected agencies? Were they responsible for maintaining systems that failed? Did they lobby for the relevant programs? Were contracts competitively awarded? These relationships may reveal legitimate expertise, commercial incentives, or possible conflicts requiring further examination.
The Palantir–CISA nomination illustrates why institutional relationships matter. Michael LoSapio's nomination preceded the outages, and the Senate's objections do not establish financial wrongdoing. But the nomination raises questions about how agencies manage conflicts of interest when executives move from major contractors into senior public positions. Ethics disclosures and recusal requirements can help answer those questions.
The fifth step concerns digital finance. Did officials cite the outages when proposing new identity requirements, payment restrictions, or centralized financial platforms? Were those policies already under development? Would participation be mandatory? Would customers retain alternatives? What appeal rights would exist? These questions could establish whether cybersecurity concerns were being used to justify changes in financial governance.
There is another possibility that investigators must preserve. The November outages may have no direct causal connection to BIS payment experiments. Project Agorá and mBridge developed over several years, long before the current congressional funding debate. Their existence does not establish that the outages were intended to accelerate digital currency adoption.
To prove deliberate manipulation, we would need stronger evidence, such as internal communications, knowingly false technical statements, concealed defects, improper procurement decisions, or records showing that officials intentionally used a manufactured emergency to obtain financial advantages. We do not currently possess that evidence.
Deuteronomy 19:15 teaches the importance of establishing matters through sufficient testimony. The principle is relevant to investigative journalism. Suspicion should lead to examination, not conviction. We should demand documents, compare independent accounts, and correct mistakes when new evidence appears.
The evidence presently supports a narrower conclusion. The outages occurred, Congress faces a deadline, technology companies have financial incentives, and international financial modernization is underway. Those facts justify investigation. They do not establish a coordinated scheme. The responsibility of the investigator is to keep following the records until the financial and technical connections can be demonstrated or reasonably ruled out.
Conclusion — Security Without Surrendering Accountability
Tonight, we began with a series of technology disruptions that raised concerns across America. Important services failed within a short period, and people wondered whether the country was experiencing a coordinated cyberattack. Federal officials told Congress that the major incidents under review appeared to be separate technical problems rather than malicious attacks. That assessment deserves consideration, but it does not eliminate questions about the reliability of essential systems.
We learned that the FAA disruption involved maintenance work and a router problem during an infrastructure upgrade. We examined the difficulties organizations face when modern software interacts with aging equipment. We also considered the possibility that artificial intelligence is accelerating vulnerability discovery faster than some organizations can safely install repairs. That explanation remains a developing technical hypothesis rather than a proven cause of every outage.
We then examined the financial environment. Congress faces a December 11 funding deadline and an approaching change in political control. Those circumstances can create pressure to make decisions quickly. Technology contractors have commercial incentives to encourage modernization spending. But the evidence does not establish that the November outages caused Congress to approve billions of dollars in additional AI cybersecurity contracts.
We also corrected an important misunderstanding about the proposed $350 billion defense package. The proposal was under discussion before the outages, and it involved broad military priorities. It cannot honestly be presented as money generated by the November disruptions. If we want to follow the money, we must identify actual appropriations, obligations, contracts, and payments rather than combining unrelated figures.
The Palantir–CISA nomination provided another concrete issue for examination. A senior executive from a major government technology contractor was nominated to lead an important federal cybersecurity agency. The nomination preceded the outages and encountered Senate opposition. That does not establish wrongdoing, but it illustrates why ethics rules, transparency, and independent oversight matter when private-sector executives enter public office.
Our investigation then moved beyond Washington. The BIS and participating financial institutions have developed working prototypes for tokenized wholesale payments. Project Agorá conducted real-value testing involving 28 institutions, six currencies, and approximately 800,000 Swiss francs. Project mBridge demonstrated another approach to international settlement, while Saudi Arabia's departure reminded us that participation in these experiments can change.
These developments may improve financial efficiency, but they also raise questions about governance. Who establishes the rules? Who controls access? What happens when a system fails? Can a legitimate customer challenge an incorrect decision? The more society depends on digital infrastructure, the more important these questions become.
The Bible provides guidance in Micah 6:8, which calls us to act justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with God. Justice requires honest financial dealings. Mercy requires concern for people harmed by institutional mistakes. Humility requires admitting what we do not know. Those principles apply to governments, corporations, and investigators alike.
Americans should demand independent technical reviews of major outages, transparent records of public spending, competitive contracting, meaningful financial alternatives, and effective remedies when essential services fail. They should also resist the temptation to accept either frightening accusations or reassuring official statements without examining the evidence.
There is nothing inherently wrong with modernizing technology. A secure financial system can benefit society. Reliable government networks can protect essential services. But progress should be measured by results rather than promises, and public money should be spent with care.
Our central scenario remains plausible: technological disruptions can increase demand for cybersecurity spending, and security concerns can influence the design of future financial systems. What remains unproven is whether the November incidents caused particular spending decisions or expanded financial controls.
That is where the investigation stands. We have established the events, identified the incentives, and examined the institutions. We have also identified the records needed to determine whether a stronger connection exists.
The responsibility of a Christian investigator is not to frighten the audience into accepting a conclusion. It is to examine the evidence faithfully, correct errors openly, and encourage wise judgment.
Because the final question is not simply whether Washington will spend billions of dollars. It is whether those expenditures will produce greater security, preserve meaningful freedom, and leave the institutions involved accountable to the people they serve.
Bibliography
Bank for International Settlements. “Central Bank Cryptocurrencies.” BIS Quarterly Review, September 2017.
Bank for International Settlements. BIS Quarterly Review. March 2020.
Bank for International Settlements. “DeFi Risks and the Decentralisation Illusion.” December 2021. https://www.bis.org/publications/defi-risks-and-decentralisation-illusion.
Bank for International Settlements. “Project Agorá.” Project documentation, prototype report, and real-value testing results, 2026. https://www.bis.org/project/agora.
Bank for International Settlements. “Project mBridge.” Project documentation and reports, 2021–2024. https://www.bis.org/project/mbridge.
CBS News. “‘No Indication’ Recent Outages Are Related to Coordinated Cyberattacks, Officials Say.” November 18, 2026. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/network-outages-cyber-malicious-activity-homeland-security-hearing/.
CyberScoop. “Consensus Mounts That Tech Outages Were Fueled by Patching of AI-Discovered Vulnerabilities.” November 18, 2026. https://cyberscoop.com/tech-outages-ai-vulnerability-patching/.
Defense One. “Trump Nominates Palantir Security Chief Michael LoSapio to Lead CISA.” November 2026. https://www.defenseone.com/business/2026/11/trump-nominates-palantir-security-chief-michael-losapio-lead-cisa/417144/.
Federal News Network. “While $350 Billion Reconciliation Bill Is Dead, Top Republican Says There Is Path for Smaller Package.” November 19, 2026.
Fitts, Catherine Austin. Dillon Read & Co. Inc. & The Aristocracy of Stock Profits. Solari, 2005.
Saudi Central Bank. “Project mBridge.” Official project summary. https://sama.gov.sa/en-US/Supervision/Innovation-Projects/Pages/mBridge.aspx.
United States Congress. Congressional Record. November 9, 2026. Executive nominations received by the Senate.
United States Congress. Congressional Record. November 20, 2026. Notice of intent to object to the nomination of Michael LoSapio.
United States House of Representatives. Committee on Homeland Security. Hearing on worldwide threats, November 18, 2026.
United States Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Confirmation hearing and prepared statement of Michael J. LoSapio, November 19, 2026.
White House. “‘No Indication of a Cyberattack’: DNI Clayton and Secretary Rubio on Recent Tech Outages.” November 18, 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/11/no-indication-of-a-cyberattack-dni-clayton-and-secretary-rubio-on-recent-tech-outages/.
Endnotes
The November 18 House Homeland Security Committee hearing provides the principal official assessment of the recent technology disruptions. Federal officials reported finding no evidence that the major incidents under review were connected through a coordinated malicious cyberattack. Their statements should be distinguished from independent forensic reports concerning individual systems.
The FAA disruption was attributed to problems arising during maintenance involving telecommunications infrastructure and router operations. The technical explanation identifies a potential cause of the outage but does not eliminate the need to examine system resilience, contractor responsibilities, and recovery procedures.
The theory that AI-assisted vulnerability discovery accelerated patching and contributed to some outages was discussed by lawmakers and outside specialists. It should not be presented as a confirmed cause of every November disruption.
The December 11 funding deadline is an established legislative event. Its proximity to the outages does not establish that particular appropriations or contracts were approved because of those incidents.
The proposed $350 billion defense reconciliation package was under discussion before the recent outages. Its reported reduction to a possible smaller package concerns broad defense priorities and does not represent verified cybersecurity contract awards.
Government authorizations, appropriations, obligations, and payments represent different financial stages. Investigators should use the appropriate category when reporting expenditure amounts.
Michael LoSapio's nomination to lead CISA was submitted on November 9, before the recent cluster of outages. His employment at Palantir and the subsequent Senate scrutiny raise legitimate oversight questions but do not establish misconduct.
Senator Ron Wyden's November 20 notice of intent to object to unanimous-consent consideration of the nomination is documented in the Congressional Record. The objection should not be described as a finding of financial wrongdoing.
Project Agorá's July 2026 real-value testing involved 28 institutions, six currencies, 30 transactions, 17 scenarios, and approximately CHF 800,000 in total value. The experiment concerned wholesale cross-border payments, not compulsory retail digital currency adoption.
The BIS identifies SIX as the operational facilitator and Kaleido as the technology provider for Project Agorá's real-value testing. Their roles establish participation in the project, not improper financial benefit.
Project mBridge reached the minimum viable product stage in 2024. The BIS announced in October 2024 that it was handing the project over to participating institutions.
The Saudi Central Bank states that its planned mBridge experimentation ended in 2025. Later reporting described Saudi Arabia's withdrawal. Historical participation should not be confused with current membership.
Catherine Austin Fitts's professional background is documented through historical government records. Her published interpretations concerning financial power and institutional control require independent corroboration when applied to specific contemporary events.
The proposed connection between November's outages and accelerated federal cybersecurity spending remains unestablished without identifiable legislation, funding changes, procurement records, and supporting technical evidence.
The proposed connection between cybersecurity concerns and expanded digital financial control is an institutional and technological scenario, not a demonstrated compulsory system.
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