FAA Ground Stop Investigation: Congress Warned About AI Before Nationwide Rollout

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Opening — America Grounded Its Airplanes, but Congress Had Already Sounded the Alarm

On November 13, 2026, Americans were confronted with something that should concern every citizen. Airplanes were grounded across the country following a reported failure involving the Federal Aviation Administration's communications infrastructure. Passengers were stranded, schedules were disrupted, and questions immediately began circulating about what had happened. But tonight, I want us to examine something more important than the shutdown itself. I want us to investigate the decisions that were made before it happened.

Three days earlier, the FAA had announced the nationwide expansion of a new artificial intelligence aviation platform known as SMART, developed by a private company called Air Space Intelligence. The technology was intended to help aviation officials make better decisions by processing enormous amounts of information. On the surface, that sounds like progress. But what happens when the government begins depending upon technology that the American people cannot independently examine?

Here is where our investigation becomes interesting. Before the nationwide expansion, members of Congress had already raised concerns about the system. They questioned its testing, safety assessments, cybersecurity protections, and the involvement of air traffic controllers. They also asked about an evaluation period described as lasting ninety days. Yet the nationwide expansion was announced approximately fifty days after that evaluation reportedly began.

Now think about that for a moment. If Congress was asking whether the proper testing had been completed, who was responsible for answering those questions? And what evidence did the FAA have when it decided the technology was ready?

Then we followed the money. We discovered a federal contract with a potential value approaching $876 million. We examined the company's investors, its international engineering operations, and reports that the government had considered obtaining a financial interest in the contractor itself. We also discovered that the company maintains software development operations in Poland, raising legitimate questions about source-code security, access permissions, and oversight.

None of these findings proves that artificial intelligence caused the shutdown. None proves that foreign intelligence agencies were involved. And none establishes that the contractor committed wrongdoing. Those distinctions matter because our responsibility is to investigate the truth, not manufacture an explanation.

But there is another question we cannot ignore. Reports concerning the shutdown point toward overloaded communications equipment and possibly a network update. If that is what happened, we need to understand why essential aviation infrastructure could be disrupted so severely. Was the equipment outdated? Was a change improperly tested? Were backup systems sufficient? And who was responsible for ensuring that a failure could not spread throughout the system?

This brings us to the purpose of tonight's investigation.

For years, Americans have been told that technological advancement means greater efficiency, better security, and improved government services. Billions of dollars are committed to modernization, private contractors receive enormous opportunities, and elected officials announce improvements. But how often do we stop and ask whether those improvements actually make our lives safer?

Scripture reminds us in Luke 14:28 that a person intending to build a tower must first consider the cost and whether the work can be completed. That principle applies to government as surely as it applies to individuals.

Tonight, we are not beginning with an accusation. We are beginning with common sense. Before America places greater responsibility in the hands of artificial intelligence, shouldn't its government be able to demonstrate that the technology has been properly examined?

Because the airplanes being grounded may have been the symptom. The cause may lie in decisions made long before November 13.

Investigation 1 — The Warning Before the Shutdown: What Did Congress Know?

Before we examine the November 13 shutdown, we need to travel backward to September 21, 2026. That was the day Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy and FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford introduced SMART, an artificial intelligence-supported aviation management system. According to the Department of Transportation, SMART could analyze approximately 200 streams of information, including weather, aircraft routes, traffic congestion, and staffing. Its purpose was to help aviation officials anticipate problems before they happened.

That sounds like a reasonable improvement. Nobody wants airplanes sitting on runways unnecessarily, and nobody wants air traffic controllers overwhelmed by information. But introducing new technology into a system responsible for millions of human lives requires something more important than promises. It requires demonstrated safety, independent evaluation, and accountability.

On October 9, seven members of Congress, including Senator Chris Van Hollen and Representative Don Beyer, sent a letter to Secretary Duffy and Administrator Bedford. They were not asking whether artificial intelligence could improve aviation. They were asking whether the FAA had completed the necessary work before allowing the technology into operational use.

Their letter contained eighteen major questions. Had the FAA formally authorized the system? Was a signed safety-risk assessment completed? Were normal acquisition or safety procedures shortened? Who validated the artificial intelligence models? Were air traffic controllers properly consulted and trained? Who would be responsible if an AI recommendation contributed to an accident?

These were not accusations of sabotage. They were basic questions about responsibility.

Now consider the timeline. Congress described SMART's September 21 introduction as the beginning of a ninety-day evaluation before broader nationwide deployment. That would place the end of the evaluation around December 20. Yet on November 10, approximately fifty days after the initial launch, the FAA announced expansion into airspace managed by all twenty-two regional air traffic control centers.

The agency described its initial deployment as successful. It reported that SMART had helped reroute 180 flights, saving an average of ten minutes and nearly eighty gallons of fuel per rerouted flight. Those numbers may demonstrate operational benefits. But fuel savings and reduced delays do not, by themselves, establish cybersecurity readiness, system resilience, or completion of safety testing.

There is an important distinction here. The congressional letter described a ninety-day evaluation, but we have not established whether completing all ninety days was a legally binding requirement or whether the FAA had authorized an earlier expansion under separate criteria. That is precisely why the agency's approval records matter.

Congress requested answers by October 19. In the public material we examined, we could not locate a complete response resolving those questions. That does not mean the FAA never answered. It means we cannot independently verify what evidence justified its decision.

Then, three days after the nationwide expansion announcement, the country's aviation system experienced a major communications failure. Officials have not established that SMART caused the disruption. The reported equipment problems may be entirely separate.

But common sense demands that we examine what happened before the shutdown, not simply what officials said afterward.

Here is the question I want you to remember. When members of Congress asked whether a system was properly tested, and the government expanded it before the described evaluation period ended, who verified that the necessary safeguards were in place?

Because accountability does not begin when something fails. Accountability begins when someone signs the authorization allowing it to operate.

Investigation 2 — The $875 Million Contract: What Did American Taxpayers Actually Purchase?

Whenever the government announces a major technological improvement, I want to know three things. What are we buying? Who owns what we are buying? And how much will the American people ultimately pay? Those questions become especially important when the technology involves something as essential as the nation's air traffic management system.

On June 23, 2026, the Federal Aviation Administration awarded Air Space Intelligence a contract with a potential value of $875.95 million. The agreement extends through June 2038, approximately twelve years. That is a substantial commitment involving a private technology company and one of America's most important public responsibilities.

But there is something we must understand about that number. The government did not immediately hand the company $875 million. Federal procurement records show approximately $23.34 million obligated through September 21. The larger figure represents the contract's potential value if the government exercises its options. Obligated money is not necessarily money already paid.

What exactly did taxpayers purchase?

The contract covers two related technologies. The first, Flow Management Data and Services, or FMDS, is intended to replace older systems used to manage traffic throughout American airspace. The second, SMART, uses information about weather, flight schedules, airport capacity, and aircraft movements to recommend ways of reducing congestion.

The FAA describes these systems as tools for helping aviation professionals make better decisions. They do not independently fly airplanes or replace the human beings responsible for aviation safety.

Air Space Intelligence says it had already invested nearly $100 million developing its technology before receiving the FAA contract. Its existing Flyways AI platform had been used by commercial airlines and military customers. That means the government was purchasing access to technology with an operational history, rather than funding an entirely new invention from nothing.

There was also competition. Federal procurement records report twelve offers, while aviation reporting identified Palantir and Thales among the companies competing for the work. We therefore cannot fairly claim that ASI received the contract without a competitive process.

But competition alone does not answer whether taxpayers received the best agreement.

Here is where our investigation moves beyond the advertised price. When a private company develops software that becomes essential to government operations, who owns the underlying source code? Can the FAA independently inspect it? Can another contractor maintain the system if ASI fails? Can the government continue operating the technology if the company's financial circumstances change?

Those are not small contractual details. They determine whether taxpayers are purchasing lasting operational independence or becoming dependent upon a private supplier.

The public procurement information we examined does not establish the complete intellectual-property rights, source-code escrow provisions, transition arrangements, or termination protections contained in this agreement. We would need the relevant contract clauses and technical attachments to answer those questions.

There is another issue. The contract covers twelve years, but technology changes rapidly. How will the FAA measure performance? What happens if promised savings never materialize? Are payments tied to independently verified results, or simply to delivery milestones?

We should not assume the answers. We should demand that they be documented.

Because spending $875 million is not necessarily wasteful if the investment produces measurable public benefits. But even a competitively awarded contract can become expensive if the government loses the ability to maintain, replace, or independently examine what it purchases.

And that brings us to the question every taxpayer should be asking.

When this twelve-year agreement ends, will America own a stronger aviation system that it can independently operate, or will it still need permission, support, and continuing payments from the company that built it?

Investigation 3 — Air Space Intelligence: Who Owns the Technology and Who Controls It?

When the American government awards a private company a contract worth nearly $876 million, most people naturally focus on the price. But there is another question that deserves just as much attention. Who owns the company receiving that money, and what happens when the government responsible for overseeing its work considers becoming an investor in that same company?

Air Space Intelligence, now also known as ASI, is a privately held American technology company headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts. Its leadership includes cofounder and chief executive Phillip Buckendorf and cofounder and chief technology officer Krzysztof Dorosz. The company develops artificial intelligence software for aviation, military operations, and other complex logistical systems.

On October 20, 2026, Bloomberg reported that ASI had raised another $325 million in private financing, bringing its valuation to approximately $3 billion. The investment round was led by Spark Capital, with participation from Andreessen Horowitz, Craft Ventures, and affiliates of Citadel Securities, among others.

Now consider what that means. A company that received a major federal aviation contract in June attracted hundreds of millions in additional private investment four months later. Its technology was becoming commercially valuable, and investors were positioning themselves to benefit from its future growth.

That is how private investment works. There is nothing inherently improper about investors financing a company that wins government contracts. But the American people should understand the relationship between public spending and private financial opportunity.

Then we discovered something unusual.

On October 15, Politico reported that the FAA was pursuing an ownership interest in Air Space Intelligence. According to an internal agency document, the government had prepared preliminary investment terms and was discussing a financial instrument known as a warrant. A warrant could give the government the right to purchase company shares at an agreed price.

Think about that arrangement. The FAA is responsible for evaluating aviation technology, overseeing its deployment, and holding contractors accountable. Yet the agency was reportedly considering becoming financially interested in the success of one of those contractors.

Supporters could argue that government ownership might allow taxpayers to benefit if the company's value increases. That possibility deserves consideration. But it creates another question. What happens when the organization responsible for judging a contractor's performance also has a financial reason to want that contractor to succeed?

Would the FAA remain willing to suspend the technology if independent testing uncovered serious problems? Would it cancel the contract if another company developed a safer system? Who would independently examine those decisions?

We should be precise. Public reporting has not established that the FAA completed an ownership agreement. Nor have we established that any FAA official personally owned shares or improperly benefited. The reported arrangement remained under discussion, and questions had been raised about the agency's legal authority to pursue it.

There is also a distinction between a company's valuation and its actual earnings. A $3 billion valuation does not mean ASI has $3 billion in cash or that taxpayers paid that amount.

But here is the larger issue. Government should be able to demonstrate that public safety decisions are made independently of financial incentives. If the government becomes both customer and investor, that independence must be protected by clear rules and outside oversight.

Because the question is not whether private companies should profit from developing useful technology. The question is whether the people responsible for protecting American aviation can remain completely accountable to the public when the financial interests of government and contractor begin to overlap.

And that is something Americans deserve to understand before another dollar is committed.

Investigation 4 — Why Poland? The International Software Supply Chain

When Americans think about national security, they often picture military bases, intelligence agencies, and foreign governments. But today, national security also depends upon something most people never see: computer software. And that software may be developed thousands of miles away from the country depending upon it.

Our investigation into Air Space Intelligence led us to Gdańsk, Poland, a major Baltic port city. This is not simply a mailing address. ASI maintains an engineering operation there, recruiting programmers, machine-learning specialists, and cloud infrastructure engineers to develop aviation technology.

Polish business reporting identifies two Polish cofounders, Krzysztof Dorosz and Łukasz Kukiełka, as members of the subsidiary's management. Corporate records cited by that reporting show the Polish company was registered in May 2021 and is owned by the American parent company.

Now, there is nothing inherently suspicious about employing Polish engineers. Poland is a NATO ally, and its technology sector includes highly qualified professionals. American companies routinely develop software internationally. But when that software supports critical government infrastructure, the location of development raises legitimate questions about oversight.

Consider what ASI's own employment advertisements reveal. Positions in Gdańsk involve cloud infrastructure, software engineering, artificial intelligence, and technologies such as Python, Rust, Kubernetes, and Amazon Web Services. One advertised cloud engineering position describes maintaining production systems, developing deployment pipelines, and improving the reliability of mission-critical aviation software.

That is important because writing software and operating software are two different responsibilities. An engineer may develop a program without having permission to access the government's live systems. But whoever approves updates, controls deployment credentials, or administers production infrastructure can occupy a particularly sensitive position.

So who holds those permissions?

Can engineers working overseas submit changes to software eventually used by the FAA? Certainly, international development makes that technically possible. But we have not established whether ASI's Polish employees contribute directly to the FAA deployment, whether they can approve releases, or whether they possess access to sensitive government data.

Those distinctions must remain clear.

There is another reason to examine the security arrangements. Poland has repeatedly faced espionage and sabotage threats attributed by its authorities to Russian intelligence operations. On November 10, Reuters reported that Polish authorities arrested two Ukrainian nationals suspected of conducting espionage and sabotage on Russia's behalf.

That report does not implicate ASI. It demonstrates the wider security environment in which international technology companies operate.

And that brings us to an important discovery. The FAA already has policies governing access to sensitive National Airspace System information. Its September 2025 order concerning external data releases recognizes that unauthorized access to certain aviation information could threaten national security.

Therefore, the question is not whether safeguards should exist. The FAA already acknowledges the need for them.

The question is whether those safeguards were applied, independently verified, and documented for this particular contractor and its international development organization.

Who reviews the source code? Who approves software updates? Who controls production access? Can the FAA independently identify every organization with access to sensitive information? And can it disable contractor access without interrupting essential operations?

We should not accuse Polish engineers of wrongdoing simply because they work outside America. That would be unfair and unsupported.

But Americans are entitled to know whether their government maintains independent control over technology supporting their aviation infrastructure.

Because national security is not determined by where a company's headquarters are located. It is determined by who can access the systems, who can change them, and who is responsible when something goes wrong.

Investigation 5 — Who Examined the Code? The National Security Question

When Americans board an airplane, they trust that the people responsible for their safety have examined the equipment, tested the procedures, and prepared for emergencies. But what happens when essential aviation decisions increasingly depend upon software that the public cannot examine and that government officials may not fully understand?

This brings us to one of the most important questions in our investigation. Who independently examined the software developed by Air Space Intelligence before the FAA expanded its use nationwide?

First, we need to understand what SMART actually does. It collects and analyzes aviation information, including weather conditions, flight schedules, airspace congestion, and aircraft movements. It then recommends adjustments intended to improve traffic flow. Human aviation officials remain responsible for deciding whether to act upon those recommendations.

That distinction matters. SMART does not independently fly airplanes or replace air traffic controllers. But software does not need direct control of an aircraft to create problems. Incorrect information, unreliable recommendations, compromised data, or unexpected network demands can affect the people making operational decisions.

Imagine a hospital where doctors remain responsible for treating patients, but a computer system begins providing incorrect laboratory results. The computer never touches the patient, yet its information could influence medical decisions. Aviation faces a similar challenge when professionals rely upon complex digital systems.

That is why independent testing matters.

In their October 9 letter, members of Congress asked the FAA whether SMART had completed formal safety assessments, cybersecurity reviews, and independent validation of its artificial intelligence models. They also questioned whether normal approval procedures had been shortened and whether aviation professionals had been sufficiently involved.

Those questions point toward several different security responsibilities.

First, the government must understand where the software comes from. Modern applications frequently depend upon code developed by other companies and distributed through third-party libraries. A weakness in one component can become a weakness in the larger system.

Second, the government must control software updates. Even properly tested software can fail when a configuration changes or an update behaves differently in a live environment. Independent review, controlled deployment, and the ability to reverse changes are essential protections.

Third, the government must understand who has access. Developers, administrators, cloud providers, and subcontractors may possess different permissions. The critical issue is whether those permissions are limited, monitored, and independently audited.

Fourth, the government must ensure that a failure cannot spread unnecessarily. If an AI recommendation system becomes unavailable, aviation officials should retain the ability to operate safely without depending upon it.

These are established principles of cybersecurity and system resilience. They do not require us to assume espionage or malicious intent.

Now consider what happened on November 13. Federal officials described overloaded routers and switches that disrupted aviation communications. Preliminary accounts have not established that SMART caused the problem. We therefore cannot claim that its software overwhelmed the network.

But we can ask whether the FAA documented how SMART connects to existing systems and whether those connections were independently tested under abnormal conditions.

The public records we examined do not establish who completed the final source-code review, what vulnerabilities were identified, or which officials approved the cybersecurity assessment. That absence of public documentation is not proof that the reviews never occurred.

Nevertheless, the government should be able to demonstrate that appropriate safeguards existed.

Because the central question is not whether artificial intelligence is good or evil. It is whether the people responsible for protecting American aviation can independently verify the technology they have chosen to trust.

And if they cannot demonstrate that independence, then the problem began long before the first airplane was grounded.

Investigation 6 — The November 13 Shutdown: What Actually Failed?

On November 13, 2026, the Federal Aviation Administration experienced a major disruption involving the communications infrastructure used to manage American air traffic. Aircraft were held on the ground, passengers faced delays, and the country was reminded just how dependent modern transportation has become upon computer networks that most citizens never see.

But before we blame artificial intelligence, foreign governments, or cybercriminals, we need to understand what actually failed.

According to the preliminary account attributed to Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy, communications instability began around 3:36 p.m. Eastern. Routers and switches reportedly became overloaded, producing inconsistent information and disrupting normal aviation operations.

Those words are important. A router directs information between networks. A switch moves information between connected devices. Neither needs to be physically destroyed to stop working properly. A configuration error, excessive network traffic, malfunctioning equipment, or defective software update can interrupt communications even when the hardware remains intact.

Think about a highway system. If every vehicle suddenly receives instructions to use the same road, traffic stops moving. The road itself may be perfectly intact, but the system directing traffic has failed. Computer networks can experience similar problems when equipment receives more information than it can process or when routing instructions become unreliable.

Some reporting has raised the possibility that an update to the FAA's private telecommunications network contributed to the disruption. L3Harris has been identified in reporting concerning that infrastructure. However, we have not obtained an official technical report establishing which update, device, or contractor action caused the failure.

That distinction is essential. A reported possibility is not a completed investigation.

Now consider the timing. Three days earlier, the FAA had announced nationwide expansion of SMART, its new artificial intelligence-supported aviation management platform. It is reasonable to ask whether the expansion changed network traffic, introduced new connections, or required modifications to existing infrastructure.

But timing alone cannot answer those questions. We have not established that SMART connected to the equipment that failed, generated excessive traffic, or contributed to the shutdown.

To determine that, investigators would need the actual network records: equipment logs, configuration changes, traffic measurements, software deployment histories, and the sequence of events leading to the failure.

There is another question. Why did a communications problem become serious enough to disrupt aviation nationwide?

Critical infrastructure should be designed to withstand individual equipment failures. Backup systems, redundant connections, controlled updates, and emergency operating procedures exist precisely because technology can malfunction.

If those protections were present, why were they insufficient? If they worked as designed, what circumstances exceeded their capabilities? And if a single change could affect multiple facilities, who approved that architecture?

These questions matter whether the cause was aging equipment, human error, defective software, or something more serious.

Federal officials have not publicly established that the incident resulted from a cyberattack. We should not manufacture one simply because foreign intelligence threats exist.

But neither should Americans accept the phrase “technical failure” as a complete explanation. A technical failure describes what happened to equipment. It does not necessarily explain why the failure occurred, why protections were insufficient, or who was responsible.

That is the difference between examining a symptom and investigating a cause.

The airplanes stopped moving on November 13. The decisions governing the communications network, its maintenance, its updates, and its emergency protections were made long before that afternoon.

And until those decisions are examined, we do not have the complete story.

Investigation 7 — NVIDIA, Microsoft, and the Possibility of a National Security Response

When the Federal Aviation Administration grounded airplanes across America on November 13, 2026, something else was happening in the technology world. Microsoft was dealing with a major international service disruption, while NVIDIA faced questions involving suspected Chinese intelligence connections. Three separate stories were unfolding within days of one another, and each involved technology that governments and businesses increasingly depend upon.

Now, common sense tells us that events happening close together are not necessarily connected. But common sense also tells us that when critical systems fail, investigators should examine possible connections before dismissing them.

Let's begin with Microsoft.

On November 12, Microsoft experienced a widespread disruption affecting services including Outlook, Teams, and other Microsoft 365 applications. Businesses and government offices depend upon these systems for communication and daily operations. The following day, the FAA experienced its nationwide communications failure.

That timing naturally raised questions. Did the FAA depend upon affected Microsoft services? Could a shared network provider, cloud connection, or software dependency have contributed to both incidents?

Microsoft denied that its outage was connected to the FAA shutdown. Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin also described the incidents as separate. We found no documented technical connection demonstrating that one caused the other.

But an official denial is not a substitute for understanding the infrastructure. An independent investigation would examine whether the affected systems shared providers, network routes, authentication services, or other critical dependencies.

Now consider NVIDIA.

During the same week, NVIDIA faced allegations concerning its chief executive's relationship with a businesswoman suspected by American officials of connections to Chinese intelligence. The company retained outside legal counsel to investigate the allegations and stated that it had no reason to believe confidential information had been compromised.

Those allegations deserve examination, but they do not establish that NVIDIA supplied American aviation information to Chinese intelligence. Nor have we identified evidence connecting NVIDIA's controversy to the FAA shutdown.

The distinction matters because NVIDIA manufactures technology used throughout artificial intelligence computing. The widespread use of a company's products does not establish that the company participated in an intelligence operation.

This brings us to the national security response.

During the FAA shutdown, Homeland Security officials said there was no evidence indicating a cyberattack. Secretary Mullin nevertheless acknowledged that investigators could not rule out every possibility while the technical investigation remained underway.

That is a reasonable position during an unfolding incident. Investigators must examine equipment failures, software changes, malicious activity, and human error before reaching a final conclusion.

But we discovered something more important than the coincidence of three news stories.

In September 2026, the Government Accountability Office reported that the FAA had not completed certain cybersecurity risk assessments and security documentation involving threats to aviation communications. The report also identified gaps in monitoring capabilities and weaknesses in protecting some aviation communications applications.

Those findings did not establish the cause of the November shutdown. They concerned specific communications threats, including spoofing and interference. Nevertheless, they documented unresolved security responsibilities before the incident occurred.

That is where our attention belongs.

We do not need to invent a secret operation involving Microsoft, NVIDIA, or China to recognize that America's aviation infrastructure faces genuine cybersecurity challenges.

The government already knew that some protections required improvement.

So the question becomes whether those weaknesses were addressed, whether new technology introduced additional dependencies, and whether officials can demonstrate that the November failure was investigated independently.

Because national security is not simply about identifying an enemy after something goes wrong.

It is about recognizing vulnerabilities before an enemy—or an ordinary equipment failure—has the opportunity to exploit them.

Investigation 8 — The Air Traffic Controllers: Were the People Responsible for Safety Included?

Imagine building a new computer system for a hospital without involving the nurses who use its information every day. The engineers might understand the software, and the administrators might understand the budget. But would either fully understand what happens when that technology encounters the unexpected realities of an emergency?

Now consider America's air traffic control system, where human beings make decisions affecting thousands of aircraft and millions of passengers.

On September 21, 2026, the FAA introduced SMART, its new artificial intelligence-supported aviation management platform. Government officials described the technology as a major advancement in predicting congestion, identifying better routes, and reducing delays.

But the following day, aviation publication FLYING reported something remarkable. The National Air Traffic Controllers Association, known as NATCA, said it had not participated in SMART's design, testing, or implementation.

That statement deserves attention.

NATCA represents the professionals responsible for safely managing aircraft throughout American airspace. These are people who understand what happens when weather changes unexpectedly, communications fail, airports become congested, or pilots require immediate assistance.

Why would their union report being excluded from the development of technology intended to influence aviation decisions?

There is an important qualification. Representative Don Beyer later reported that FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford told him experienced former controllers had helped design SMART. If accurate, that means controller expertise may have contributed even though NATCA itself was not involved.

But those are two different things. Consulting former controllers does not necessarily establish that the current workforce participated in operational testing, training development, or evaluation of the system under actual working conditions.

The distinction becomes more important when we examine how SMART operates.

The FAA says its artificial intelligence does not replace air traffic controllers. Instead, specialists evaluate the system's recommendations before forwarding them to operational facilities. Local aviation officials retain authority to accept or reject suggested changes.

That is an important safeguard. But retaining human authority does not automatically guarantee that humans receive enough information to exercise independent judgment.

Suppose a computer recommends rerouting several aircraft around approaching weather. The recommendation might save fuel and reduce delays. But what happens if the weather information is outdated? What happens if the system overlooks a staffing limitation or creates congestion somewhere else?

A controller must understand not only what the software recommends, but why the recommendation makes sense.

That requires training, transparency, and the ability to challenge the system.

In October, members of Congress specifically questioned the FAA about controller involvement, operational training, and accountability. They wanted to know what procedures existed to ensure that aviation professionals could safely evaluate SMART's recommendations.

Then, on November 10, the FAA announced that SMART was active across all twenty-two regional air traffic control centers.

The agency reported encouraging results, including reduced flight times and fuel consumption. Those benefits deserve recognition. But efficiency measurements cannot substitute for evidence that frontline personnel were adequately prepared.

We have not established that controllers were improperly trained or that SMART contributed to the November 13 communications failure. Nor have we obtained the complete training records or operational acceptance reports.

Nevertheless, a reasonable question remains.

If the government introduces technology intended to assist highly trained professionals, shouldn't those professionals have a meaningful role in determining whether the technology is ready?

The people who write software understand how it is supposed to function. The people who use it understand what happens when reality refuses to follow the plan.

And when human lives are involved, both kinds of knowledge matter.

Because modernization should strengthen professional judgment, not place another layer of technology between responsibility and understanding.

Investigation 9 — Follow the Money: Who Benefits From America's Aviation Modernization?

Whenever the government announces that billions of dollars are needed to solve a problem, Americans should ask two questions. How much money has already been spent, and why hasn't that spending solved the problem? Those questions become especially important when a national emergency is followed by demands for even greater government investment.

Our investigation began with Air Space Intelligence, a private company awarded a twelve-year FAA contract worth up to $875.95 million. Federal procurement records show approximately $23.34 million obligated through September 21, 2026. That distinction matters because the contract's maximum value is not the amount already paid.

But this contract is only one piece of a much larger modernization effort.

In July 2025, Congress approved $12.5 billion for air traffic control improvements and related aviation priorities. Then, on November 13, 2026, the White House and Department of Transportation requested another $30.1 billion for aviation modernization.

The latest proposal included $10.1 billion for air traffic control improvements, $2 billion for control towers, and $18 billion for airport projects. Within the air traffic control request were billions for automation, workstations, cloud computing, and telecommunications infrastructure.

Now consider the timing. The administration's request was already being prepared before the November 13 nationwide ground stop. The shutdown did not create the modernization proposal. But the failure immediately demonstrated why aging infrastructure had become a national concern.

And that leads us to an important distinction. A crisis can reveal a legitimate need for investment while simultaneously creating financial opportunities for contractors. Those two things can be true without anyone manufacturing the crisis.

The Government Accountability Office had already warned in September that the FAA's ambitious modernization program needed stronger cost estimates and schedule planning. Its examination identified thirteen modernization programs and raised concerns about whether the government could reliably measure the overall cost and progress.

GAO also identified Peraton as the contractor responsible for coordinating the first phase of modernization. FAA officials reported a negotiated integration price of approximately $876 million, separate from Air Space Intelligence's contract.

Think about what that means. The government is not simply purchasing one artificial intelligence program. It is financing an enormous network of software developers, telecommunications providers, equipment manufacturers, engineering firms, and systems integrators.

Each contractor may perform legitimate work. But someone must ensure that all these separate investments actually function together.

Here is where common sense becomes essential.

If taxpayers finance new software while the communications equipment supporting it remains vulnerable, have we modernized the system or simply added expensive technology to an unstable foundation?

And if the government pays one contractor to build a system, another to integrate it, and others to maintain the network, who accepts responsibility when the complete system fails?

We should also examine how success is measured. Are contractors rewarded for completing installations, or for demonstrating that the aviation system becomes more reliable? Are cost overruns independently examined? Can Congress compare promised savings against actual performance?

We have not established that ASI, Peraton, or another contractor improperly profited from the November shutdown. Nor does requesting additional funding prove corruption.

But taxpayers deserve more than announcements, projected savings, and promises of modernization.

They deserve independently verified results.

Because the purpose of spending billions on aviation infrastructure should not be to create profitable government contracts. It should be to build a system that protects human life, withstands failures, and continues serving Americans when something goes wrong.

And until government can demonstrate those outcomes, the most important question remains unanswered.

Are we paying to solve the problem, or merely paying more every time the problem returns?

Investigation 10 — Who Authorized the Risk, and Who Is Accountable?

After examining the congressional warnings, the $875 million contract, the company's investors, its international software development, cybersecurity concerns, the nationwide shutdown, and the billions requested for modernization, we arrive at the most important question of this investigation. Who was responsible for making sure everything was ready?

Because when something goes wrong in government, responsibility often becomes difficult to locate. One agency approves the technology. Another department provides funding. A private contractor develops the software. Another company maintains the communications infrastructure. And when the system fails, Americans are told that an investigation is underway.

But who was responsible before the failure?

On October 9, members of Congress asked the FAA a remarkably specific question. Had the agency made a formal decision authorizing SMART for operational use? They wanted to know which official approved it, when that decision was made, and whether the authorization came from the FAA's Air Traffic Organization or Transportation Department leadership.

That question goes directly to accountability.

Congress also requested the signed safety-risk assessment, independent validation of the artificial intelligence, information about controller training, and an explanation of whether normal approval procedures had been shortened.

These were not complicated philosophical questions. They were requests for documents that should establish how the government reached its decisions.

The lawmakers described an initial ninety-day evaluation beginning September 21. Yet the FAA announced nationwide expansion on November 10, approximately fifty days later.

Was the evaluation completed early? Were different standards applied? Did officials determine that the technology was sufficiently safe to expand while further testing continued?

We have not established the answers. And without the authorization records, we cannot determine whether the agency departed from a binding requirement or exercised authority it already possessed.

Now consider the November 13 communications failure.

Officials described overloaded equipment in an aging aviation network. The FAA and Homeland Security reported no evidence establishing that SMART caused the disruption or that a cyberattack was responsible.

Those preliminary findings deserve consideration. But the public still needs a technical explanation identifying what failed, what triggered the failure, and why backup protections could not prevent such widespread disruption.

There is also a financial responsibility.

The government awarded ASI a contract worth up to $875.95 million while pursuing a much larger modernization program. Additional billions were requested for communications, automation, and infrastructure.

Who determines whether those investments solve the weaknesses identified by the Government Accountability Office? Who verifies the results independently? And who accepts responsibility when separate contractors deliver systems that must operate together?

This investigation has not established corruption, sabotage, or negligence. It has established that important questions about authorization, testing, operational oversight, and infrastructure resilience remain unresolved in the public records we examined.

That distinction matters.

Scripture teaches in 1 Corinthians 4:2 that stewards must be found faithful. Stewardship means accepting responsibility for what has been entrusted to our care. That principle applies to public officials responsible for protecting human life and spending taxpayer money.

Americans should not have to choose between supporting technological progress and demanding accountability. We can support modernization while insisting that every important decision be documented, tested, and independently examined.

And here is the question I want to leave with you.

If the FAA can identify the official who authorized SMART, produce the completed safety assessments, explain the early nationwide expansion, and demonstrate why the November shutdown was unrelated, then the American people deserve to see that evidence.

If those records reveal shortcomings, the government should correct them openly.

Because accountability is not about finding someone to blame after a disaster.

It is about ensuring that the people entrusted with protecting Americans can demonstrate that they fulfilled their responsibilities before disaster strikes.

And that is why we investigate the cause before accepting the symptom.

Conclusion — The Failure May Have Started Long Before the Airplanes Stopped

Tonight, we began with airplanes sitting on the ground. Americans were delayed, aviation operations were disrupted, and government officials were trying to explain why a communications system responsible for supporting the nation's air traffic had failed. But instead of stopping with the shutdown, we traveled backward. We examined the warnings, the contracts, the technology, the people making decisions, and the money being spent.

And what we discovered should cause every American to ask some very reasonable questions.

Before the November 13 shutdown, members of Congress had already questioned the FAA about its new artificial intelligence platform. They wanted to know whether proper testing had been completed, whether cybersecurity safeguards were in place, whether air traffic controllers had been involved, and who authorized the system for operational use.

The lawmakers described a ninety-day evaluation beginning September 21. Yet nationwide expansion was announced approximately fifty days later. We have not established that the FAA violated a requirement. But we also have not located the complete public documentation explaining why expansion was approved before that described evaluation period ended.

That is not an accusation. It is an unanswered question.

We also discovered that the government awarded Air Space Intelligence a contract potentially worth nearly $876 million. The company maintains international engineering operations, has attracted substantial private investment, and was reportedly involved in discussions about a possible government ownership stake.

None of those circumstances proves wrongdoing. Private companies can develop valuable technology, international engineers can perform excellent work, and government investment can sometimes benefit taxpayers.

But every one of those arrangements requires independent oversight.

Then we examined the shutdown itself. Officials described overloaded communications equipment, while reporting raised questions about a possible network update. We have not established that SMART caused the failure, that foreign intelligence agencies were involved, or that the Microsoft and NVIDIA controversies were connected.

And I want to emphasize something important. We should never replace an incomplete government explanation with an accusation we cannot prove. That would make us no more reliable than the institutions we are examining.

But neither should we confuse an explanation with accountability.

Saying that routers became overloaded tells us what happened to the equipment. It does not fully explain why the equipment became overloaded, why safeguards were insufficient, or whether the failure could have been prevented.

That is the difference between a symptom and a cause.

We also followed the money. Billions of dollars have been committed to aviation modernization, with billions more requested. Some of that spending may be necessary. Aging infrastructure cannot be repaired with political speeches, and new technology is not automatically dangerous.

But spending more money does not guarantee better results.

The American people deserve to know whether their investments produce systems that are safer, more reliable, and less dependent upon individual contractors. They deserve to know who owns the technology, who can modify it, and who is responsible when it fails.

Above all, they deserve leaders who understand that responsibility begins before something goes wrong.

Perhaps the most important lesson tonight is that we do not need to know the final cause of the November 13 shutdown to recognize the importance of the questions raised before it happened.

We can examine those warnings without claiming they predicted the failure. We can investigate financial incentives without accusing investors of corruption. And we can demand cybersecurity accountability without inventing foreign enemies.

That is what discernment requires.

Our mission has never been to frighten people into believing that every failure is part of a secret plan. Our mission is to examine what can be established, challenge what remains unexplained, and correct ourselves when new evidence changes our understanding.

So tonight, I leave you with one final question.

If the government cannot clearly demonstrate who authorized a technology, what testing justified its deployment, and who remains accountable when essential infrastructure fails, how can Americans independently judge whether their money and their safety are being properly protected?

The airplanes stopped on November 13.

But the decisions worth examining were made long before that day.

And that is why we investigate the cause before the symptom.

Bibliography

• Air Space Intelligence. “Careers and Engineering Opportunities.” Corporate recruitment materials. Accessed November 13, 2026. https://www.airspace-intelligence.com/.
• Federal Aviation Administration. “Modern Skies: SMART Nationwide Expansion.” News release, November 10, 2026.
• Federal Aviation Administration. National Airspace System External Data Release Policy. FAA Order 1200.22F. September 2025.
• Federal Procurement Data System. “Contract Award 693KA726C00064: Air Space Intelligence.” Federal contract records, June–September 2026.
• Government Accountability Office. Air Traffic Control Systems: Ambitious New Modernization Effort Needs to Improve Cost and Schedule Planning. GAO-26-107992. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, September 14, 2026. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107992.
• Government Accountability Office. Aviation Cybersecurity. GAO-26-108439. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, September 2026.
• Handelman, Ethan. “Did New AI Software Just Crash the FAA's Network?” Independent Voter News, November 13, 2026. https://ivn.us/did-new-ai-software-just-crash-the-faas-network/.
• McClain Delaney, April, Chris Van Hollen, and colleagues. “Letter to Secretary Sean Duffy and Administrator Bryan Bedford Regarding the FAA's SMART System.” October 9, 2026. Published by the Office of Senator Chris Van Hollen. https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/news/press-releases/van-hollen-joins-mcclain-delaney-colleagues-in-call-to-pause-faas-ai-tool-at-washington-area-airports.
• Office of Senator Chris Van Hollen. “Van Hollen Joins McClain Delaney, Colleagues in Call to Pause FAA's AI Tool at Washington-Area Airports.” October 9, 2026.
• Reuters. Reporting on Air Space Intelligence financing, FAA modernization funding, Polish security investigations, and the November 13, 2026, aviation disruption. October–November 2026.
• Semafor. “FAA Equity Talks Raise Questions About the Agency's Legal Authority.” October 16, 2026. https://www.semafor.com/article/10/16/2026/faa-equity-talks-raise-questions-about-the-agencys-legal-authority.
• U.S. Department of Transportation. “Modern Skies: Trump's Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy Selects Air Space Intelligence to Deploy State-of-the-Art Air Traffic Control Software, Revolutionize Our Skies.” June 22, 2026. https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/modern-skies-trumps-transportation-secretary-sean-p-duffy-selects-air-space.
• Wilkinson, Lindsey. “FAA Blames Telecommunications Issue for Nationwide Ground Stop.” FedScoop, November 13, 2026. https://fedscoop.com/faa-nationwide-ground-stop-tech-telecommunications-issue/.
• Bishop, Todd. “Officials Blame Aging FAA Telecom Gear as U.S. Airspace Reopens, See No Link to Microsoft or AI.” GeekWire, November 13, 2026. https://www.geekwire.com/2026/dhs-chief-sees-no-microsoft-link-to-faa-ground-stop-says-possible-ai-role-being-investigated/.
• The Holy Bible. King James Version. 1611.

Endnotes

1. U.S. Department of Transportation, “Trump’s Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy Delivers State-of-the-Art Air Traffic Control Management Tool,” September 21, 2026. Documents the initial SMART deployment, its approximately 200 data streams, and its advisory role in air traffic management.
2. Chris Van Hollen, April McClain Delaney, and congressional colleagues, letter to Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy and FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford, October 9, 2026. Requests information about safety testing, authorization, cybersecurity, controller training, and the initial ninety-day evaluation.
3. Federal Aviation Administration, November 10, 2026, SMART nationwide expansion announcement. Describes deployment across twenty-two air traffic control centers and reports early operational efficiency results.
4. Federal procurement records, contract 693KA726C00064, awarded to Air Space Intelligence, June 23, 2026. Identifies the approximately $875.95 million maximum contract value and reported obligations of approximately $23.34 million through September 21, 2026.
5. U.S. Department of Transportation, June 22, 2026, announcement selecting Air Space Intelligence for aviation modernization. Explains the relationship between SMART, Flow Management Data and Services, and the FAA's modernization objectives.
6. Federal procurement records and aviation industry reporting concerning the competitive selection of Air Space Intelligence. These sources describe the acquisition process and competing technology providers.
7. Bloomberg, October 20, 2026, reporting on Air Space Intelligence's $325 million financing round, reported $3 billion valuation, and participating investors.
8. Politico, October 15, 2026, reporting on discussions concerning a potential FAA financial interest in Air Space Intelligence, including a possible warrant arrangement.
9. Semafor, October 16, 2026, reporting on legal and oversight questions surrounding the FAA's potential ownership interest in a contractor it also evaluates.
10. Air Space Intelligence, corporate information and engineering recruitment materials. Documents the company's international development organization, engineering technologies, and advertised responsibilities involving cloud infrastructure and production software.
11. Polish corporate and technology reporting concerning Air Space Intelligence's Gdańsk subsidiary, its registration, management, and relationship to the American parent company.
12. Federal Aviation Administration, Order 1200.22F, September 2025. Establishes policies governing the release and protection of certain National Airspace System information.
13. Reuters, November 2026, reporting on Polish investigations involving suspected espionage and sabotage. Provides regional security context but does not establish any connection to Air Space Intelligence.
14. Congressional letter of October 9, 2026. Requests information concerning independent AI validation, safety-risk management, cybersecurity testing, deployment authorization, and operational accountability.
15. Government Accountability Office, Aviation Cybersecurity: Enhanced Air Safety Requires FAA to Better Mitigate Threats to Aircraft Communications, GAO-26-108439, September 2026. Identifies incomplete assessments, documentation, and monitoring capabilities concerning spoofing, jamming, and related communications threats.
16. Associated Press, November 13, 2026, coverage of the nationwide FAA ground stop. Reports widespread aviation disruption, telecommunications problems, and preliminary statements concerning the absence of evidence of a cyberattack.
17. ABC News and other November 13, 2026, reporting on Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy's description of overloaded routers and switches, inconsistent network information, and the reported beginning of communications instability.
18. November 13, 2026, reporting concerning a possible update to the FAA's private telecommunications network. The precise technical cause, affected components, and contractor responsibilities require confirmation through an official incident investigation.
19. Microsoft service-status communications and November 12–13, 2026, reporting concerning disruptions affecting Microsoft 365 services. No verified technical connection to the FAA shutdown was established.
20. November 2026 reporting concerning NVIDIA and allegations involving suspected Chinese intelligence connections. These allegations do not establish that NVIDIA supplied FAA information to foreign intelligence services or participated in the aviation disruption.
21. Department of Homeland Security and Department of Transportation public statements, November 13, 2026, addressing possible cybersecurity causes and the preliminary assessment of the FAA communications failure.
22. National Air Traffic Controllers Association statement reported by FLYING, September 22, 2026. Describes the union's reported lack of participation in SMART's design, testing, and implementation.
23. Congressional correspondence and aviation reporting concerning controller consultation, operational training, human oversight, and the use of former air traffic controllers during SMART development.
24. U.S. Department of Transportation, September 21, 2026, SMART announcement. States that FAA personnel review recommendations and that local aviation officials retain decision-making authority.
25. Government Accountability Office, Air Traffic Control Systems: Ambitious New Modernization Effort Needs to Improve Cost and Schedule Planning, GAO-26-107992, September 2026. Examines modernization planning, program costs, schedules, and the need for improved oversight.
26. Federal aviation modernization funding legislation enacted in 2025 and Department of Transportation announcements concerning the initial $12.5 billion modernization commitment.
27. November 2026 administration budget communications and Reuters reporting concerning a proposed additional $30.1 billion for aviation infrastructure and modernization.
28. Government Accountability Office and FAA modernization materials concerning the role of systems integrators, telecommunications contractors, and technology suppliers in the National Airspace System.
29. Congressional letter of October 9, 2026, questions concerning the formal In-Service Decision, signed Safety Risk Management Document, approval authority, and possible changes to standard review procedures.
30. FAA and Department of Homeland Security statements, November 13, 2026, concerning the preliminary investigation. These statements do not constitute a final independent technical root-cause report.
31. First Corinthians 4:2, King James Version. Cited in the discussion of stewardship, public responsibility, and accountability.
32. Luke 14:28, King James Version. Cited in the opening discussion of planning, preparation, and evaluating the cost before beginning an undertaking.
33. The investigation's conclusions distinguish confirmed government records, preliminary reporting, reasonable technical questions, and unverified hypotheses. The proximity of SMART's expansion to the ground stop does not independently establish causation.
34. The FAA's completed deployment authorizations, signed safety assessments, full contractor technical attachments, source-code access audits, and final incident report remain necessary to resolve the investigation's central unanswered questions.

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